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The latest term of the U.S. Supreme Court ended
in early July. Following a pattern which first emerged
in the early 1960's, the Court handed down a significant number of decisions involving criminal procedure. This article reviews many of these decisions.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Several important issues concerning the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures were decided by the Court. In contrast
with some recent terms, many of the Court's decisions
strengthened, rather than weakened, that provision.

Stop and Frisk
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), the Supreme Court recognized for the first
time that the detention of a person on less than
probable cause was constitutionally permissible under
t certain circumstances. Although the Court found
~i that such "stops" were "seizures" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, they were not violative of
that clause if based upon reasonable suspicion. A
number of issues left unresolved by Terry concerning
the scope of the stop and frisk doctrine were addressed
by the Court last term.
In Dunaway v. New York, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979),
the Court ruled upon the constitutionality of prolonged detentions for the purpose of interrogation, a
question which it had reserved ten years earlier in
Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969). Acting
upon an informant's tip, which proved insufficient to
establish probable cause, the police detained Dunaway
and later transported him to the stationhouse for
questioning. After receiving Miranda warnings, he
confessed on two occasions to killing a pizza parlor
owner during an armed robbery. At trial, Dunaway
moved to suppress those statements as well as sketches
which he had drawn during his detention. A New
York appellate court upheld the admissibility of the
statements and sketches, even though the police
lacked probable cause to arrest Dunaway. The court
stated: "Law enforcement officials may detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion for questioning

for a reasonable and brief period of time under carefully controlled conditions which are ample to protect
the individual's Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights."
People v. Dunaway, 61 App. Div.2d 299, 302, 402
N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1978), quoting People v. Morales,
42 N.Y.2d 129, 135,397 N.Y.S.2d 587,590,366
N.E.2d 248, 251 (1977).
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this analysis. In
the Court's view, upholding the legality of a seizure as
"intrusive" as Dunaway's "would threaten to swallow
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seiz.ures are
'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." 99
S.Ct. at 2256. The Court emphasized that its decision did not turn on whether the suspect was informed that he was under arrest:
Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was
found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home to
a police car, transported to a police station, and placed
in an interrogation room. He was never informed that
he was "free to go"; indeed; he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody. The application of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of
this magnitude is termed an "arrest" under state law.
The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under
arrest, was not "booked," and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless ...
obviously do not make petitioner's seizure even roughly
analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in
Terry and its progeny. /d.

Having found the detention invalid, the Court next
considered whether the evidence derived from the detention should be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Under that doctrine, the contested evidence
would be admissible only if the taint of the illegal
police conduct had been sufficiently attentuated. See
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In elaborating on the attenuation doctrine in Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975), the Court identified several
critical factors: "The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening
circumstances( ... and particularly, the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct ... " /d. at
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The Terry doctrine was also implicated in Brown v.
Texas, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979), which involved a "stop
and identify" statute. El Paso police stopped Brown
in a high crime area, requesting him to identify himself and explain what he was doing. After refusing to
answer, he was arrested for violating a Texas statute,
which provided that a"person commits an offense if
he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report
of his name and residence address to a police officer
who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." Tex. Penal Code §38.02{a). The Court,
in a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Burger, reversed the conviction. According to the
Court, Brown's detention was "a seizure of his person
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment," 99 S.Ct. at 2640, and since the record failed
to establish the existence of "a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, that the individual [was] involved in criminal activity," the conviction violated
Fourth Amendment guarantees. /d. at 2641.
The constitutionality of the statute, however, was
not addressed. The statute applies only if a person is
"lawfully stopped." If, for example, the El Paso police stopped Brown based on reasonable suspicion and
he then refused to identify himself or answer questions, could he validly be convicted under the Texas
statute? The Court left this issue unresolved; in a
footnote the Court remarked: "We need not decide
whether an individual may be punished for refusing
to identify himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements."· /d. at 2641 n.3. The issue was likewise
sidestepped in a companion case, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979), which involved a similar
provision. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens, confronted the issue in
his dissent. His answer was unequivocal: "[I] ndividuals accosted by th~ police on the basis merely of
reasonable suspicion have a right not to be searched, a
right to remain silent and, as a corollary, a right not
to be searched if they choose to remain silent." /d. at
2636.
For an excellent discussion of stop and frisk law,
see 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 1-175 (1979).

603-04. Applying these factors, the Court concluded
that Dunaway was "admittedly seized without probable cause in the hope that something might turn up,
and confessed without any intervening event of significance." qq. S.Ct. at 2259. Thus, the Court ruled that
the evidence should have been suppressed. As in
Brown, the reading of Miranda rights did not change
the result. "To admit petitioner's confession in such
a case would allow law enforcement officers to violate
the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the
knowledge that they could wash their hands in the
'procedural safeguards' of the Fifth."' /d. at 2260,
quoting Comment, 25 Emory L.J. 227, 238 (1976).
The Court also considered the applicability of the
Terry doctrine to automobile stops. In Delaware v.
Prouse, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979), police seized marijuana
in plain view from the defendant's automobile during
a "routine" traffic stop. At a suppression hearing, the
seizing officer "testified that prior to stopping the
vehicle he had observed neither traffic or equipment
violations nor any suspicious activity, and that he
made the stop only in order to check the driver's
license and registration." /d. at 1394. The state argued that its "interest in discretionary spot checks as
a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways outweighs the resulting intrusion on the privacy and
security of the persons detained." /d. at 1397. The
Supreme Court held that "stopping an automobile
and detaining its occupants constitutes a 'seizure'
within the meaning of the [Fourth and Fourteenth]
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention quite brief." /d.
at 1396. The Court also recognized the state's "vital
interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so
are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these
vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspections requirements are being observed." /d. at 1398. Nevertheless,
the Court found the practice of randomly stopping
automobiles unconstitutional. In reaching this result,
the Court questioned the efficacy of random stops
as a means of promoting the state's interest, noted the
availability of alternative methods of enforcement,
and recognized the substantial interference with personal liberty and security involved in random stops.
The Court was especially concerned about the "standard less and unconstrained discretion" entrusted to
the police in the context of random stops.
-- Two additional points deserve mention. First, the
Court's holding does not cover a situation in which
the police have "articulable and reasonable suspicion"
of a traffic offense. /d. at 1401. Second, the holding
"does not preclude ... States from developing
methods of spot checks that involve less intrusion or
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." /d.
Thus, the Court appears to be endorsing the distinction between random stops and fixed checkpoint
stops that it had earlier formulated in border patrol
cases. Compare U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 ( 1976) (upholding fixed checkpoint stops), with
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (invalidating roving patrol stops).

The Warrant Clause

In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 99 S.Ct. 2319
(1979), the Court had occasion to examine two aspects of the warrant clause- the particularity requirement and the neutrality of the issuing magistrate.
In that case two films purchased from the defendant's
adult bookstore were viewed by a state magistrate and
found to violate New York obscenity laws. A search
warrant for the seizure of other copies of these films
was then issued by the magistrate. The warrant, however, was not limited to the two films. It also authorized the seizure of additional material determined to
be obscene by the magistrate at the time of the search.
Accompanying the police to the store, the magistrate
examined numerous films and magazines. Those
which he found to be obscene were seized. A total of
397 magazines and 431 reels of film were seized during a six hour search. These items were subsequently
added to the original warrant. After indictment, the
2

to sanction such a broad based exception. Moreover,
the actual search in Chadwick could not be sustained
on an exigency rationale. Since the police had exclusive control of the footlocker at the time of the
search, "there was not the slightest danger that the
footlocker or its contents could have been removed
before a valid search warrant could be obtained." /d.
at 13.
Last term, the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 99
S.Ct. 2586 ( 1979), considered the applicability of
Chadwick to a search of a suitcase found during a
valid automobile search. Unlike Chadwick, the search
in Sanders occurred at the time the automobile was
searched. The state argued that the automobile exception, and not Chadwick, applied. While recognizing that a "closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in which it
rides," the Court pointed out that "the exigency of
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately
before the search .... " /d. at 2593. Since the suitcase was "securely within [police] control" at that
time, no exigency existed and thus a warrant was required. "Where- as in the present case- the police,
without endangering themselves or risking loss of evidence, lawfully have detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his suitcase, they s(10uld delay
the search thereof until after judicial approval has
been obtained." /d. at 2594.
See generally, Moylan, The Automobile Exception:
What it is and What it is not- A Rationale in Search
of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976).

defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion
authored by the Chief Justice, held the warrant violative of the Fourth Amendment which provides that
"no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause ...
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." The Court
commented:
Based on the conclusionary statement of the police investigator that other similarly obscene materials would
be found at the store, the warrant left it entirely to the
discretion of the officials conducting the search to de- _
cide what items were likely obscene and to accomplish
their seizure: The Fourth Amendment does not permit
such action .... Nor does the Fourth Amendment
countenance open-ended warrants, to be completed
while a search is being conducted and items seized or
after the seizure has been carried out. /d. at 2324.

Moreover, the participation of the magistrate ran
afoul of another constitutional procedure. According
to the Court, the magistrate had abandoned his position of "neutrality and detachment" because he "allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader
of the search party which was essentially a police
operation ... [ H] e was not acting as a judicial officer
but as an adjunct law-enforcement officer." /d. at
2325.

!l
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Exigent Circumstances and the Automobile Exception
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that for a
search to be reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, it generally must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause by
a neutral and detached magistrate. Thus, although
the Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, they are "jealously and carefully drawn."
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 ( 1958).
One of the more important exceptions involves the
so-called "automobile exception." See Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). Under this exception, the police may lawfully stop and search an automobile
without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the car contains contraband or evidence of a
crime. The mobility of the car, in effect, creates an
"exigent circumstance" which is thought to justify
dispensing with the protections afforded by a search
warrant. If the automobile is not mobile, however,
this exception may not be applicable. See Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977),
the Court again considered a search involving an automobile. In Chadwick the defendants were arrested
immediately after they had placed a footlocker containing marihuana in the trunk of a car. Since the
po)ice had probable cause, the arrests of the defendants and the seizure of the locker were valid. The
locker, however, was not opened until after it had
been transported to the stationhouse. Before the Supreme Court, the Government proposed a warrant exception for all movable personal property seized in a
public place upon probable cause. In effect, the
Government was attempting to extend the automobile
exception to all personal property. The Court refused

Standing
One of the most important decisions handed down
by the Court last term dealt with a defendant's standing to object to illegally seized evidence. In Rakas v.
Illinois, 99 S.Ct. 421 (1979), a police officer spotted
a car which he suspected was the getaway car in arecent robbery. After stopping the car and ordering the
occupants out, the officer found rifle shells in a
locked glove compartment and a sawed-off shotgun
under the front seat. The defendants' motion to suppress these items was denied because, according to
the trial court, they lacked standing.
The defendants argued before the Supreme Court
that they were "legitimately on the premises" at the
time of the search and they therefore had standing
under the rule first announced in Jones v. U.S., 362
U.S. 257 ( 1960). Prior to Rakas, the legitimately-onthe-premises rule had been one of the mainstays of
the standing doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court rE!pUdiated the rule, stating that "the phrase 'legitimately
on the premises' coined in jones creates too broad a
gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights."
99 S.Ct. at 429. Instead, the Court relied upon the
substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine of "reasonable expectations of privacy" in determining the constitutionality of the search. The Court concluded that
the defendants' rights had not been infringed since
they had "made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment
or area under the seat of the car in which they were
merely passengers. Like the trunk ofan automobile,
these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger
3

plicitly refer to covert entry .... " /d. at 1689. Finally, the Court held that the manner of entry need
not be specified in the order authorizing the eavesdropping. !d. at 1694.
In Smith v. Maryland, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979), the
Court focused on police use of a pen register, a mechanical device which records the numbers dialed
from a telephone but not the conversation. In U.S. v.
New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the
Court had held that Title Ill did not apply to pen
registers. In Smith the Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment was also inapplicable. Citing Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held that a person does not have "a legitimate expectation of privacy" regarding the numbers dialed from his or her telephone. The effect of Smith and New York Telephone
Co. is to remove all restrictions from the police use of
pen registers.
For a comprehensive treatment of electronic surveillance, see Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance,
(1977).

simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy." !d. at 433.
From a defense perspective, the most important aspect of Rokas is that it involves only one approach to
standing- the legitimately-on-the-premises rule.
Other methods of establishing standing were left untouched by the opinion. First, the defendants could
have gained standing by claiming an interest in the
items seized, either ownership or possession of the
shells or shotgun. The Rokas Court repeatedly emphasized that the defendants had not asserted such an
interest. /d. at 433. See also id. at 423 & 430 n.11.
Moreover, had the defendants lost the suppression
motion, the state would have been precluded from
introducing the defendant's assertions of interest in
its case-in-chief. See Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377
(1968). Second, had the defendants claimed an interest in the place searched- ownership or possession of
the automobile, they would have met the standing requirement, since reasonable expectations of privacy
are created under these circumstances. Again, the
Court noted that the defendants "asserted neither a
property nor a possessory interest in the automobile
.... " !d. at 433. Third, the Rokas decision addressed
the narrow issue of a passenger's standing to object to
searches of specific places, the glove compartment
and the area under the seat. (The Court also indicated that a car trunk would be treated similarly.)
Whether the same result would have been reached had
the items been seized from the top of the seat or
from the floor of the car was left unresolved. !d. 434
n.17. Finally, Rokas did not examine another aspect
of the jones decision -automatic standing. See id.
at 426 n.4. Where a defendant is charged with a possessory offense, standing is automatic. Rei iance on
the automatic standing rule may be unwise, however,
since its continued validity has been questioned in
another case. See Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223, 22829 ( 1973). See generally, 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure 543-612 (1979).

POLICE INTERROGATIONS
The Court decided two cases last term dealing with
police interrogation practices, both of which required
an examination of the waiver of rights mandated by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966). In North
Carolina v. Butler, 99 S.Ct. 1755 (1979), the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights after his arrest.
In addition, he read the FBI's "Advice of Rights"
form and stated that he understood those rights. Although he refused to sign the waiver at the bottom of
the form, he nonetheless told the agents: "I will talk
to you but I am not signing any form." /d. at 1756.
Subsequently he made incriminating statements
which he later sought to exclude at a suppression
hearing. On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the statements were obtained in violation of
Miranda because an express waiver was not secured
from the defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, declined to accept such "an inflexible per se
rule." /d. at 1758. The Court upheld the waiver in
Butler, but nevertheless emphasized the heavy burden
that the prosecution must carry to establish a valid
waiver:

Electronic Eavesdropping
The Court decided two cases involving electronic
surveillance. In Dalia v. U.S., 99 S.Ct. 1682 (1979),
the Court held that neither the Fourth Amendment
nor Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1976), are violated
by a covert entry to install a listening device where
the eavesdropping has been judicially authorized. The
circuit courts of appeal had divided on this issue.
Compare U.S. v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir.
1978); U.S. v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1978);
U.S. v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977), with
U.S. v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977); In re
U.S.~ 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Agrusa,
541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976).
Addressing the Fourth Amendment issue, the
Court stated: "It is well established that law enforcement officers may break and enter to execute a search
warrant where such entry is the only means by which
the warrant effectively may be executed." !d. at
1688. In addition, the Court held that Congress intended to authorize surreptitious entries when it enacted Title Ill even though the statute "does not ex-

An express written or oral statement of waiver of the
right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually
strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish
waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather
whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived
the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough.
That does not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled
with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion
that a defendant has waived his righ:ts. The courts must
presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the
prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases
waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and
words of the person interrogated. /d. at 1757.

In the second Miranda case, Fare v. Michael C., 99
S.Ct. 2560 (1979). a juvenile requested to see his probation officer during a police interrogation. The juvenile had been taken into custody after he became im4

plicated in a murder. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he was asked if he wished to give up his
right to have an attorney present. At that point, he
requested the presence of his probation officer. The
police refused to honor this request, but again in~ formed him of his right to have an attorney present.

Similarly, the Court rejected the state's argument
that federal habeas review should be foreclosed to a
state prisoner alleging discrimination in the selection
of a grand jury. In effect, the state was asking the
Court to extend its decision in Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), which foreclosed habeas review of
Fourth Amendment claims "absent a showing that
the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full
and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct
review." /d. at 494.

He waived that right and made an incriminating statement, which was subsequently admitted into evidence
by the juvenile court. On appeal the Supreme Court
of California held that a juvenile's request to see his
probation officer constituted a per se invocation of
Fifth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. According to the Court, an attorney's role in
protecting a client's Fifth Amendment rights differs
markedly from that of a probation officer. "A probation officer simply is not necessary, in the way an attorney is, for the protection of legal rights of the accused, juvenile or adult. He is significantly handicapped by the position he occupies in the juvenile system from serving as an effective protector of the
rights of a juvenile suspected of a crime." /d. at 2570.
Hence, a juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights should
be judged by the same totality of circumstances approach that is applied to adults. This is not to suggest,
however, that a juvenile's age and limited experience
would not play a significant part in that determination. As the Court noted: "Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation
of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will
allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this
into account in making a waiver determination." /d.
ll at 2572.
~
See generally, G ian nell i, Pol ice Interrogations and
Confessions, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (May-June
1979).

U"

First Amendment - Closure Orders
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. 2898
(1979), the Court returned to the free press-fair trial
controversy. Previously, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 ( 1966), the Court had overturned a conviction because of the trial court's failure to take affirmative steps to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 ( 1976), the Court struck down a "gag order"
prohibiting the reporting of evidence adduced at an
open preliminary hearing. According to the Court,
such prior restraint on speech, under the circumstances of that case, infringed First Amendment guarantees. The Court, however, left open the issue of whether a trial court could close pretrial proceedings to
protect against prejudicial pretrial publicity: /d. at
564 n.8.
Gannett Co. presented the Court with that very issue. In that case defendants moved to exclude the
public and press from a pretrial suppression hearing.
When the trial court granted the motion, a newspaper
challenged the ruling on First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds. In reviewing these challenges,
the Supreme Court held that the "constitutional guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant," 99 S.Ct. at 2906, and "that members of the public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials."
/d. at 2911. Moreover, without deciding whether the
press and public had a First Amendment right of access to pretrial proceedings, the Court held that First
Amendment rights had not been violated in this particular case since the trial court considered First·
Amendment interests and only closed the proceedings
after determining that there was a reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendants. /d. at 2912. In
addition, the denial of access "was not absolute but
only temporary," a transcript of the suppression hearing having been released after the danger of prejudice
had dissipated. /d.
Three concurring opinions were written and should
prove critical to future adjudication of this issue.
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the pretrial as~
pect of the case was of critical importance. Thus,
closure of a trial itself would present a different issue
for him. Justice Powell addressed the First Amendment issue reserved by the majority opinion. In his
view, a First Amendment right of access exists but is
not absolute. Under the circumstances of the case before the Court, Justice Powell believed that the trial
court correctly dealt with the conflict between First
and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Rehnquist opposed the Powell view; he found no First Amendment

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Grand Jury- Racial Discrimination
In Rose v. Mitchell, 99 S.Ct. 2993 (1979), defendants challenged the systematic exclusion of blacks
from the grand jury and the selection of the grand
__ jury foreman on equal protection grounds. The case
is significant because it rejects two arguments that
would have inhibited equal protection attacks on
grand jury selection procedures. First, the state argued that since the defendants had been found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt by a constitutionally valid
petit jury they should be precluded from raising the
equal protection issue. The Court refused to accept
this argument, stating: "Discrimination on the basis of
race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in
the administration of justice. Selection of members
of a grand jury because they are of one race and not
another destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process
... The harm is not only to the accused, indicted as
~e is by a jury from which a segment of the communIty has been excluded. It is to society as a whole."
~--1~. at 3000. Furthermore, even though other remedies are available to redress such violations; permitting
challenges by criminal defendants has been the princip~l method of vindicating this type of constitutional
Violation. /d. at 3001.
5

right of access and employed sweepin9 lang~~ge in
stating the consequences of the Courts de~1s1on:
" [ 1] f the parties agree on a closed proceedmg, the
trial court is not required by the Sixth Amendment
to advance any reason whatsoever for declining to
open a pretrial hearing or trial t? the publi~." /d. at
2918. It is noteworthy that he 1ncluded trw/ as well
as pretrial proceedings in his statemen~. '!"hether the
Rehnquist view would command a majonty o_f !he
Court seems doubtful in light of the other opm1ons,
including a vigorous dissent issued by four Justices.

Randolph is the progeny of an earlier landmark case,
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In that
case, an accomplice's confession implicating Bruto~
was introduced at a joint trial. Even though the tnal
judge instructed the jury that the confession co_uld
only be considered in determining the acco_mpl1ce's
guilt, the Supreme Court reversed. Accordmg to the
Court:
[T] here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is presented
here where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
stat~ments of a co-defendantwho stands accused sideby-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread
before the jury in a joint trial. /d. at 135-36.

Jury Trial

Two cases decided by the Court last term presented
jury trial issues.· Both cases involved furth_e~ development of prior decisions. In Burch v. Lou1s1ana, 99
S.Ct. 1623 (1979), the Court examined a state procedure that permitted conviction by a nonunanimous
verdict of a six-person jury in nonpetty offense cases.
While the Court had held previously that a 12-person
jury was not constitutionally required, Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 ( 1970), it had also decided that
a five-person jury was constitutionally deficient. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The Court had_
also decided that unanimous verdicts were not constitutionally mandated in noncapital cases, upholding a
10-2 verdict in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972), and a 9-3 verdict in Apodaca v. Or~gon, _406
U.S. 404 (1972). As the Court noted, the 1ssue m
Burch "lies at the intersection of our decision concerning jury size and unanimity." 99 s.qt. at 1?27.
The Court unanimously agreed that a split verd1ct by
a six-person jury violated Sixth Amendment guarantees.
The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross
section of the community was the focal point of Duren v. Missouri, 99 S.Ct. 664 (1979). In 1975 the
Court had held that the systematic exclusion of females during the jury selection process resulted in a
jury pool which was not "reasona~ly represent~tive"
of the community and therefore v1olated the fa1r
cross section requirement. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975). The system struck down in Taylor
had required female jurors to file a written declaration of their willingness to serve. The Missouri system
challenged in Duren, which provided for an a~tomatic
exemption for females, proved equally offensive to
the fair cross section requirement. While females represented 54% of the adult population, they accounted
for only 15.5% of the jury pool from which the defendant's panel was selected. By demonstrating the
critical role played by the automatic exemption in
this process, the defendant met ~is burden ?f es~ab
lishing a prima facie case of a fa1r eros~ sect1on vlol~
tion. Since the state failed to offer ev1dence establishing that the automatic exemption was not the cause_
of the underrepresentation or to advance a substantial
justification for the exemption, the Court found a
constitutional violation.

Since the Court found the instruction ineffective and
the accomplice did not take the stand, Bruton was deprived of his right to confront the extrajudicial statement. In subsequent cases the Court held Bruton
binding upon the states and retroactive, Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the
harmless error doctrine. Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 (1969). The most significant of the postBruton cases was Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622
(1971 ), which involved the applicability of Bruton to
trials in which the accomplice testifies. The Court
stated: "We conclude that where a codefendant takes
the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged
out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and
proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has been
denied no rigL [S protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." !d. at 629-30.
With this backdrop the Court decided Parker v.
Randolph. Unlike Bruton and O'Neil, th~ defendant
in Parker had also confessed, thus presentmg the
Court with the question of the applicability of Bruton
to a case involving "Interlocking confessions." The
courts of appeals had divided on this issue. Compare
Hodgesv. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978); U.S. v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3rd Cir. 1976); cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977), with lgnaciov. Guam, 413
F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943
(1970); Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.
1976). The plurality opinion in Parker distinguished
Bruton. "The right protected in Bruton- the 'cone
stitutional right of cross-examination,' ... -has far
less practical value to a defendant who_ has confes~ed
to the crime than to one who has consistently mamtained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a
codefendant's confession on cross-examination would
likely yield small advantage to the defend_ant whose
own admission of guilt stands before the JUry unchallenged." /d. at 2139. Consequently, the plurality
found the Bruton rule inapplicable.
As noted by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, the plurality opinion rests on two _dub}ous _a_ssumptions: "First, it ass,ur:'es th~t !he jury s _ab1l1ty to
disregard a codefendants madm1ss1ble and highly p_rejudicial confession is invariably increased by the exiStence of a corroborating statement by the defendant.
Second , it assumes that all unchallenged confessions

Right of Confrontation

Parker v. Randolph, 99 S.Ct. 2132 ( 1979), another
case decided by the Court last term, turned on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
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constitutional principles. "First, a reasonable jury
could well have interpreted the presumption as 'conclusive,' that is, not technically as a presumption at
all, but rather as an irrebuttable direction of the court
to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering
the presumption." /d. at 2456. Under these circumstances the jury could have "concluded that they
were directed to find against the defendant on the
element of intent" once they found that the defendant caused the victim's death. !d. at 2459. Thus, the
state was not required to prove "beyond a reasonable
doubt ... every fact necessary to constitute the crime
... charged" as required by due process. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
"Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the
instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of
the defendant's voluntary actions (and their "ordinary" consequences), unless the defendant proved the
contrary by some quantum of proof which may well
have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on
the element of intent." 99 S.Ct. 2456. Under these
circumstances the instruction would have contravened
the Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975).
The Ohio jury instruction on "natural consequences" is found at Ohio Jury Instructions- Criminal
409.56 (Provisional 197 4). See generally, Koosed &
Aynes, Constitutional Challenges to Placing the Burden of Proof of Affirmative Defenses Upon the Accused, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (Jan.-Feb. 1979).
In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 99 S.Ct.
2213 (1979), an automobile in which three male
adults and a 16-year-old girl were riding, was stopped
for a speeding violation by the police. Two handguns
were spotted in the girl's handbag, and a subsequent
search of the trunk revealed a machine gun and
heroin. All occupants were charged with illegal possession of weapons and heroin. The state's case was
buttressed by a New York statute which provided,
with certain exceptions, that the presence of a firearm
in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal
possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle.
N.Y. Penal L. §265.15(3). A majority of the Court
upheld the presumption as applied to the facts of the
case.
Allen represents a departure from the Court's prior
decisions. In a series of cases involving criminal presumptions, the Court appeared to have established
two principles concerning the prosecution's use of a
presumption which relates to elements of the charged
offense. First, notwithstanding the label, a criminal
presumption could have only the effect of a permissive inference. See C. McCormick, Evidence 817 (2d
ed. 1972) ("[l]t is unlikely that the Court would approve the use of a presumption in a criminal case
other than as a permissive inference."). Second, there
must be a "rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed .... " Tot v.
U.S., 319 U.S. 463,467 (1943). Accord, U.S. v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); U.S. v. Romano, 382
U.S. 136 (1965). As developed further in Leary v.
U.S., 395 U.S. 6 ( 1969), a rational connection means
at the very least, "that the presumed fact is more like-

by a defendant are equally reliable." /d. at 2145. It
should be kept in mind that only four Justices joined
in the plurality opinion. Three Justices dissented,
Justice Powell did not participate in the decision, and
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment on
harmless error grounds. Justice Blackmun's opinion
indicated that he did not share the plurality's view.
Thus, the issue remains clouded and the Sixth Circuit's decision applying Bruton to interlocking confessions may still be controlling in Ohio. See Hodges
v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978).

Impeachment Use of Immunized Testimony
In Harrisv. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the
Court sanctioned the impeachment use of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). Accord, Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714
(1975). Last term in New Jersey v. Portash, 99 S.Ct.
1292 ( 1979), the state argued that the Harris rationale also applied to the impeachment use of testimony
given pursuant to a grant of immunity. Portash was
granted immunity after indicating that he would claim
his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination before a state grand jury. He was
subsequently indicted for misconduct in office and
extortion. At trial the defense sought a ruling precluding the state from using Portash's grand jury testimony for the purpose of impeaching him. The trial
judge ruled in favor of the state and consequently
Portash did not testify. In addressing this issue, the
Supreme Court distinguished statements that are the
product of coercion from those taken in violation of
~ Miranda. In Harris, which involved the latter situation, the Court found the incremental deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule outweighed by the "strong
policy against countenancing perjury." /d. at 1297.
Immunized testimony, on the other hand,
is the essence of coerced testimony. In such cases there
is no question whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant's will; the witness is told to
talk or face the government's coercive sanctions, notably,
a conviction for contempt .... Balancing of interests
was thought to be necessary in Harris and Haas when the
attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided with
the need to prevent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal
with the constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible. !d.

Presumptions and Jury Instructions
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S.Ct. 2450 ( 1979),
the defendant was charged with deliberate homicide.
Under the applicable state law, the state was required
to establish that the killing was committed purposely
or knowingly. The prosecution requested a jury instruction that provided: "The law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." When the defense objected on due process grounds and offered federal decisions in support
•.··. of the objection, the judge replied: "You can give
, those to the Supreme Court. The objection is overJ
ruled." /d. at 2454. The defendant did just that and
the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court found that the jury could have con. strued the instruction in ways which would violate
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ly than not to flow from the proved fact on which it
is made to depend." /d. at 36. Whether a higher standard - beyond a reasonable doubt- is constitutionally required was left open by Leary and subsequent
cases. !d. at 36 n.64; Turner v. U.S., 396 U.S. 398,
416 (1970); Barnesv. U.S., 412 U.S. 837,842-43
(1973).
The Allen majority reworked both principles. It
recognized two types of presumptions: mandatory
and permissive. The constitutionality of permissive
presumptions, as in Allen, are to be examined asapplied in a particular case; the "more likely than not"
standard controls. In contrast, the constitutionality
of mandatory presumptions are to be examined
facially; the beyond reasonable doubt standard controls. The majority's "novel approach," as aptly described by the dissent, id. at 2234, will introduce
more confusion into an area already permeated with
confusion. For example, a mandatory presumption
in a civil case shifts, at least, the burden of production.
Thus, if no evidence controverting the presumed fact
is offered, the party in whose favor the presumption
operates is entitled to a directed verdict on that issue.
In the criminal context, however, a defendant cannot
suffer a directed verdict. Thus, although mandatory
presumptions are recognized by the Allen majority,
their meaning and effect remains clouded.
See generally, C. McCormick, Evidence ch. 36 (2d
ed. 1972); 21 C. Wright & 1<. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 684-758 (1977); 1 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 303 ( 1978).

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
!d. at 364. The continued validity of the "no evidence" rule after Winship was raised in Freeman v.
Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111 ( 1977) (dissent from de- ~
nial of certiorari). In Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct.
2781 (1979), the Court held that Winship compelled
the overruling of the no evidence standard. "After
Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction
must be not simply to determine whether the jury
was properly instructed, but to determine whether
the record evidence would reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." !d. at 2789.
The import of jackson would seem to go beyond the
context of federal habeas review. The arguments advanced by the Court apply with equal force to direct
review by state appellate courts and to directed verdict determinations by state trial courts.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Publications
Professor Wayne LaFave, the leading authority on
Fourth Amendment law, has recently published a
three volume work entitled: Search and Seizure, A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (West Publishing
Co. 1979). This work is the most comprehensive
treatment of the subject yet published. The editor of
this Reporter is co-author of another West publication: lmwinkelried, Giannelli, Gilligan & Lederer,
Criminal Evidence ( 1979). Recent articles of interest ~
include: Lee, The Grand Jury in Ohio: An Empirical
Study, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 325 (1979); Entrapment
in the State of Ohio, 5 Ohio Northern L. Rev. 642
(1979).

Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was held
binding upon the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), the right to counsel was extended to all
cases in which imprisonment is imposed. The exact
scope of the right was left open by the Argersinger
opinion. Lastterm, inScottv.lllinois,99S.Ct.1158
(1979), the Court clarified this issue. Scott was
charged with petty theft, an offense which carried a
maximum penalty of a $500 fine and a prison term of
less than a year. Upon conviction, Scott was fined
$50. He argued that his right to counsel had been
violated because the offense for which he was tried
authorized imprisonment as a sanction. Rejecting this
argument, the Court held that actual imprisonment,
rather than authorized imprisonment, triggered the
right to counsel.
See generally, S. Krantz, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Mandate of Argersinger v. Hamlin
(1976).

'

Allied Offenses of Similar Import
The Court held that the offenses of sale of heroin
and possession for sale of heroin under R.C.
3719.20(8) and R.C. 3719.20(A) are "allied offenses
of similar import" within the meaning of R.C.
2941.25(A) "when both charges arise from the same
transaction, and are predicated upon identical evidence." Consequently, the defendant's conviction for
the lesser offense of possession for sale was vacated.
State v. Roberts, No. 37848, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App.
(1979).
Privacy Act Exclusionary Rule
Although the Court found no material violation of
the defendant's right to privacy, it noted that the use
of a welfare recipient's social security number in violation of Section 7(b) of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. §552(a), to detect welfare fraud would require
the suppression of the evidence derived from the violation. In applying the exclusionary rule to such
statutory violations, the Court concluded that "evidence obtained in violation of a statute is obtained in ~
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ... "and must be suppressed. State v.
McMiller, No. CR-40584, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. C.P.
(1979).

HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
In Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960),
the Supreme Court set forth the standard for judging
the sufficiency of evidence in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Under that standard, a federal court
could reverse a state conviction only if there was no
evidence to support the conviction. Subsequently, in
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court declared for the first time that due process protects a
criminal defendant against conviction "except upon
8

